Μετά την προ μηνών ομολογία του ΔΝΤ για λάθος πολλαπλασιαστή, έρχεται η νέα ομολογία του για τη λάθος ακολουθούμενη στρατηγική στην αντιμετώπιση της ελληνικής κρίσης. Μέχρι την επόμενη (τρίτη) ομολογία του ΔΝΤ για κάποιο άλλο λάθος από τα τόσα που έχουν κάνει (κι έχουν εφαρμοστεί από τα ιθαγενή όργανά τους) έχοντας οδηγήσει στη δυστυχία τους έλληνες πολίτες - και που όσοι ασχολούμαστε με τα οικονομικά (αλλά και ο σημερινός πρωθυπουργός) έχουμε επισημάνει από την αρχή - ας ασχοληθούμε λίγο με την τωρινή ομολογία.
Πιο κάτω παραθέτω (1) άρθρο της Guardian που αναφέρει τα βασικά σημεία της παραδοχής του ΔΝΤ για τη ζημιά που έχει προκαλέσει στην ελληνική οικονομία η εφαρμοζόμενη πολιτική λιτότητας και (2) την άποψη του γνωστού καθηγητού και οικονομικού αναλυτή Γιάννη Βαρουφάκη γι'αυτό το θέμα με απαντήσεις που έδωσε σε σχετικά ερωτήματα του Βασ.Κωστούλα (να σημειώσω, ότι δεν συμφωνώ σε ένα-δυο σημεία από αυτά που αναφέρει ο καθηγητής - τα σημειώνω με αστερίσκους - αλλά εδώ ενδιαφέρει η δική του άποψη - τη δική μου επιφυλάσσομαι να τη γράψω σε μελλοντικό post).
IMF admits: we failed to realise the damage austerity would do to Greece
The International Monetary Fund admitted it had failed to realize the damage austerity would do to Greece as the Washington-based organisation catalogued mistakes made during the bailout of the stricken euro-zone country.
Πιο κάτω παραθέτω (1) άρθρο της Guardian που αναφέρει τα βασικά σημεία της παραδοχής του ΔΝΤ για τη ζημιά που έχει προκαλέσει στην ελληνική οικονομία η εφαρμοζόμενη πολιτική λιτότητας και (2) την άποψη του γνωστού καθηγητού και οικονομικού αναλυτή Γιάννη Βαρουφάκη γι'αυτό το θέμα με απαντήσεις που έδωσε σε σχετικά ερωτήματα του Βασ.Κωστούλα (να σημειώσω, ότι δεν συμφωνώ σε ένα-δυο σημεία από αυτά που αναφέρει ο καθηγητής - τα σημειώνω με αστερίσκους - αλλά εδώ ενδιαφέρει η δική του άποψη - τη δική μου επιφυλάσσομαι να τη γράψω σε μελλοντικό post).
IMF admits: we failed to realise the damage austerity would do to Greece
The International Monetary Fund admitted it had failed to realize the damage austerity would do to Greece as the Washington-based organisation catalogued mistakes made during the bailout of the stricken euro-zone country.
In an assessment of the rescue conducted jointly with the European Central Bank
(ECB) and the European commission, the IMF said it had been forced to
override its normal rules for providing financial assistance in order to
put money into Greece.
Fund officials had severe doubts about whether Greece's debt would be sustainable even after the first bailout was provided in May 2010 and only agreed to the plan because of fears of contagion.
While it succeeded in keeping Greece in the eurozone, the report admitted the bailout included notable failures.
"Market confidence was not restored, the banking system lost 30% of its deposits and the economy encountered a much deeper than expected recession with exceptionally high unemployment."
In Athens, officials reacted with barely disguised glee to the report, saying it confirmed that the price exacted for the €110bn emergency package was too high for a country beset by massive debts, tax evasion and a large black economy."
Under the weight of such measures – applied across the board and hitting the poorest hardest – the economy, they said, was always bound to dive into an economic death spiral.
"For too long they [troika officials] refused to accept that the programme was simply off-target by hiding behind our failure to implement structural reforms," said one insider. "Now that reforms are being applied they've had to accept the bitter truth."
The IMF said: "The Fund approved an exceptionally large loan to Greece under an stand-by agreement in May 2010 despite having considerable misgivings about Greece's debt sustainability. The decision required the Fund to depart from its established rules on exceptional access. However, Greece came late to the Fund and the time available to negotiate the programme was short."
But having agreed that there were exceptional circumstances that warranted the biggest bailout in the Fund's history, officials were taken aback by the much bigger than expected slump in the Greek economy. The country is now in its fifth year of recession and the economy has contracted by 17%. The IMF thought it would contract by just 5.5%.
In the evaluation of the package provided in 2010, the IMF said: "Given the danger of contagion, the report judges the programme to have been a necessity, even though the Fund had misgivings about debt sustainability.
"There was, however, a tension between the need to support Greece and the concern that debt was not sustainable with high probability (a condition for exceptional access).
"In response, the exceptional access criterion was amended to lower the bar for debt sustainability in systemic cases. The baseline still showed debt to be sustainable, as is required for all Fund programmes."
In the event, the report added, the Fund was open to criticism for making economic projections that were too optimistic."
While the report says a deep recession was unavoidable, it is critical of senior officials in Brussels and European capitals who said Greece would fare better outside the euro. Concerns that Greece could be ejected from the euro and return to the drachma intensified an already febrile situation.
"Confidence was also badly affected by domestic social and political turmoil and talk of a Greek exit from the euro by European policymakers," it said.
Brussels also struggled to co-ordinate its policies with the ECB in Frankfurt, according to the report.
"The Fund made decisions in a structured fashion, while decision-making in the eurozone spanned heads of state and multiple agencies and was more fragmented."
The Greek media recently quoted IMF managing director Christine Lagarde describing 2011 as a "lost year" partly because of miscalculations by the EU and IMF.
The authoritative Kathimerini newspaper said the report identified a number of "mistakes" including the failure of creditors to agree to a restructuring of Greece's debt burden earlier – a failure that had had a disastrous effect on its macroeconomic assumptions.
"From what we understand the IMF singles out the EU for criticism in its handling of the problem more than anything else," said one well-placed official at the Greek finance ministry.
He added: "But acknowledgement of these mistakes will help us. It has already helped cut some slack and it will help us get what we really need which is a haircut on our debt next year."
Fund officials had severe doubts about whether Greece's debt would be sustainable even after the first bailout was provided in May 2010 and only agreed to the plan because of fears of contagion.
While it succeeded in keeping Greece in the eurozone, the report admitted the bailout included notable failures.
"Market confidence was not restored, the banking system lost 30% of its deposits and the economy encountered a much deeper than expected recession with exceptionally high unemployment."
In Athens, officials reacted with barely disguised glee to the report, saying it confirmed that the price exacted for the €110bn emergency package was too high for a country beset by massive debts, tax evasion and a large black economy."
Under the weight of such measures – applied across the board and hitting the poorest hardest – the economy, they said, was always bound to dive into an economic death spiral.
"For too long they [troika officials] refused to accept that the programme was simply off-target by hiding behind our failure to implement structural reforms," said one insider. "Now that reforms are being applied they've had to accept the bitter truth."
The IMF said: "The Fund approved an exceptionally large loan to Greece under an stand-by agreement in May 2010 despite having considerable misgivings about Greece's debt sustainability. The decision required the Fund to depart from its established rules on exceptional access. However, Greece came late to the Fund and the time available to negotiate the programme was short."
But having agreed that there were exceptional circumstances that warranted the biggest bailout in the Fund's history, officials were taken aback by the much bigger than expected slump in the Greek economy. The country is now in its fifth year of recession and the economy has contracted by 17%. The IMF thought it would contract by just 5.5%.
In the evaluation of the package provided in 2010, the IMF said: "Given the danger of contagion, the report judges the programme to have been a necessity, even though the Fund had misgivings about debt sustainability.
"There was, however, a tension between the need to support Greece and the concern that debt was not sustainable with high probability (a condition for exceptional access).
"In response, the exceptional access criterion was amended to lower the bar for debt sustainability in systemic cases. The baseline still showed debt to be sustainable, as is required for all Fund programmes."
In the event, the report added, the Fund was open to criticism for making economic projections that were too optimistic."
While the report says a deep recession was unavoidable, it is critical of senior officials in Brussels and European capitals who said Greece would fare better outside the euro. Concerns that Greece could be ejected from the euro and return to the drachma intensified an already febrile situation.
"Confidence was also badly affected by domestic social and political turmoil and talk of a Greek exit from the euro by European policymakers," it said.
Brussels also struggled to co-ordinate its policies with the ECB in Frankfurt, according to the report.
"The Fund made decisions in a structured fashion, while decision-making in the eurozone spanned heads of state and multiple agencies and was more fragmented."
The Greek media recently quoted IMF managing director Christine Lagarde describing 2011 as a "lost year" partly because of miscalculations by the EU and IMF.
The authoritative Kathimerini newspaper said the report identified a number of "mistakes" including the failure of creditors to agree to a restructuring of Greece's debt burden earlier – a failure that had had a disastrous effect on its macroeconomic assumptions.
"From what we understand the IMF singles out the EU for criticism in its handling of the problem more than anything else," said one well-placed official at the Greek finance ministry.
He added: "But acknowledgement of these mistakes will help us. It has already helped cut some slack and it will help us get what we really need which is a haircut on our debt next year."
Η άποψη του Γ.Βαρουφάκη για τη νέα ομολογία του ΔΝΤ
Πώς ερμηνεύετε την
τελευταία τοποθέτηση του ΔΝΤ, σύμφωνα με την οποία αφενός εκτιμήθηκαν λαθεμένα
οι συνέπειες του προγράμματος στην Ελλάδα, αφετέρου ένα «κούρεμα» του ελληνικού
χρέους όφειλε να αποφασιστεί από την Ευρωζώνη ήδη το 2010;
Η έκθεση του ΔΝΤ αποτελεί μία έκφραση οργής απέναντι στη
γερμανική κωλυσιεργία, κυρίως όσον αφορά στην τραπεζική ενοποίηση (*). Παράλληλα,
προετοιμάζει τη διεθνή κοινότητα για μια πιθανή αποχώρηση του οργανισμού από
την τρόικα. Θεωρώ ότι οι κυβερνήσεις των κρατών – μελών της Ευρωζώνης, με το
μεγαλύτερο πρόβλημα την αδιέξοδη πολιτική την οποία ακολούθησε το ΔΝΤ μαζί με
την ΕΚΤ και την Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή υπό την καθοδήγηση της Γερμανίας, έχουν την
εξής ιερή υποχρέωση: Πριν αποχωρήσει το ΔΝΤ, να χρησιμοποιήσουν αυτήν την
έκθεση. Να κάνουν μια προσπάθεια εύρεσης κοινού τόπου με τον διεθνή οργανισμό,
ώστε να μπει ένα φρένο σε αυτήν την πολιτική η οποία καταδικάζει όλους τους
λαούς της Ευρώπης στην εξαθλίωση.
Λέτε ότι το ΔΝΤ
προετοιμάζει το έδαφος για μία πιθανή απεμπλοκή από τον ευρωπαϊκό μηχανισμό
στήριξης. Για ποιον λόγο;
Το ΔΝΤ ποτέ δεν συμφωνούσε με αυτήν την πολιτική (*). Την είχε
αποδεχτεί ώστε να μπει στο παιχνίδι της διάσωσης των κρατών – μελών της
Ευρωζώνης, για δικούς του θεσμικούς λόγους. Από εκεί και πέρα, όμως, δεν
περίμενε ότι η Γερμανία θα υπονόμευε απλά βήματα τα οποία έπρεπε και πρέπει να
γίνουν προκειμένου να μην συνεχιστεί αυτή η σκοτοδίνη της Ευρωζώνης. Ο κόμπος
έφτασε στο χτένι με την τραπεζική ενοποίηση, την οποία η Γερμανία ενέκρινε το
καλοκαίρι του 2012, αλλά στη συνέχεια υπονόμευσε.
Στην έκθεση του ΔΝΤ
αναφέρεται ότι μία αναδιάρθρωση του ελληνικού χρέους θα έπρεπε να έχει γίνει
πολύ νωρίτερα.
Το Ταμείο ήθελε από
την αρχή το «κούρεμα» των ελληνικών ομολόγων. Αλλά είδε πως ούτε η γερμανική,
ούτε η ελληνική κυβέρνηση το ήθελε. Εισήλθε στη διαδικασία κυνικά, ελπίζοντας
ότι μετά από ένα εύλογο χρονικό διάστημα θα επικρατούσε η λογική στην Ευρώπη.
Αλλά αυτό δεν γίνεται ακόμη και σήμερα. Πλέον, το ΔΝΤ, που λογοδοτεί στους
χρηματοδότες του, οι οποίοι δεν πιστεύουν στα μάτια τους όταν βλέπουν την
Ευρώπη να υπονομεύει τον εαυτό της, αναγκάζεται να διαχωρίσει τη θέση του.
Θεωρείτε ότι η
ελληνική πλευρά μπορεί να αξιοποιήσει διαπραγματευτικά αυτό το χάσμα, όπως το
περιγράφετε, στο εσωτερικό της τρόικας;
Προφανώς μπορεί (*?). Όταν είναι σε εξέλιξη μία ανοιχτή σύρραξη
ανάμεσα στα μέλη της τρόικας, πρέπει να είσαι ιδιαίτερα ανόητος για να μην το
εκμεταλλευτείς.
Προς την κατεύθυνση
μιας νέας αναδιάρθρωσης του χρέους ή για παράδειγμα μιας σειράς μειώσεων φόρων;
Το ΔΝΤ δεν θα ενδιαφερόταν να συνεργαστεί με την ελληνική
κυβέρνηση για μία μείωση φόρων. Σίγουρα όμως θα το έκανε για το «κούρεμα» του
χρέους, όπως και για τη μορφή της τραπεζικής ενοποίησης.
